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INTRODUCTION
The judicially created doctrine of Congressional plenary power
over Native American tribes and individuals continues to deeply affect
the liberties and activities of the tribes! Tribal sovereignty over the
management of land and resources rightfully belonging to Native
American tribes is oftentimes subject to Congressional monitoring and
delegation to the Secretary of the Interior. The judiciary also plays a
distinct hand in determining the extent of tribal sovereignty over tribal
property. Water rights persist, especially in the western United States,
as one of the most precious and provocative sources of dispute between American Indian tribes and individuals and non-Indian users.
This article evaluates whether the proverbial glass of reserved water
rights will be half full or half empty when allotted land returns full circle to its original Native American owners.
The reserved rights doctrine allocates certain quantities and types
of water to certain Indian tribes based on a number of variables, including the purpose of the Indian reservation and the intent of Congress regarding the reservation.
This paper specifically analyzes
whether the reserved rights doctrine applies to Native American lands
allotted by the United States and reacquired by an Indian tribe on the
open market that the United States then takes into trust on behalf of
the tribe.3 The answer is yes: the reserved rights doctrine applies to
allotted lands that an Indian tribe reacquires from the open market,
and that the United States subsequently takes into trust on behalf of
the tribe.
Two key conclusions support this finding. First, the purpose of the
reservation is not connected to the land itself, but is attached to the
unique nature of tribal status and the tribal relationship with the federal government. That status and relationship remain intact even if
the ownership of the land changes. Second, Congressional plenary
power and policy promotes tribal self-determination and reacquisition
of land, thus allowing tribes the benefits of the land that originally was
theirs in accordance with Congressional intent.
This article begins with a brief recounting of federal policy regarding Indian affairs and focuses on the General Allotment Act. Then,
the article explains some of the key types of land affecting Native
American rights and interests. The article continues to further articulate the reserved rights doctrine generally, as well as which water rights
2. See Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1898) (articulating an
assumption that Congress "possesses plenary power of legislation in regard to [Indian
tribes], subject only to the Constitution of the United States.").
3. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct.
1058 (2009), limits the conclusions of this article and the continuum in Appendix I to
tribes officially recognized by the federal government in 1934, when Congress enacted
the Indian Reorganization Act.
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apply to allotted land. Next follows a description of case law regarding
water rights for lands previously allotted, transferred out of Indian
ownership, and then returned to Indian ownership, which are known
as reacquired lands. Before concluding with policy considerations and
a recommendation, this article compares jurisprudence regarding the
federal reacquisition policy and taxing rights over reacquired lands
with the application of the reserved rights doctrine to reacquired
lands. Appendix I presents a continuum of the legal likelihood, based
on case law and academic work, that a certain type of reacquired land
would achieve the full benefits of the reserved rights doctrine under
judicial review.
I. "CONGRESSIONAL PLENARY POWER"
United States federal jurisprudence began attributing "plenary"
power over Indian affairs to Congress as early as 1832. 4 Chief Justice
John Marshall described how the power to regulate and control interactions with the Cherokee Nation belonged exclusively to the United
States Congress under the authority of Article I of the United States
Constitution.5 In 1903, the Court established Congress' plenary authority as political, "not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government."' The contemporary United States Supreme Court continues to reinforce the doctrine of Congressional plenary power consistently throughout its federal Indian law jurisprudence. 7
Congressional exercise of plenary power implicated an extensive
series of federal policies that continue to affect Native American tribes
intensively. The following sections briefly describe the history of federal Indian policy and focus on the General Allotment Act, which created the predicament of land and water rights examined in this article.

4. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558 (1832) (stating that
"[C]ongress assumed the management of Indian affairs; first in the name of the
United Colonies; and, afterwards, in the name of the United States.").
5.
Id. at 531; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress has the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce... with the Indian Tribes.").
6.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
7.
See City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 224
(2005); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 194 (2004); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,
529-30 (2000); South Dakota. v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998); Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391 (1921); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306 (1902); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896).
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A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY
From the early 1800's through 1850, the United States government
enforced a policy described as "removal."8 At that time, the United
States entered into treaties with Indian tribes in the eastern part of the
country, which "exchange[d]" their respective lands in the East for
land in the West, making a more expansive area available to white setdement and avoiding inter-sovereign conflict between the tribal and
state governments. 9 As settlement pushed westward, the removal policy
morphed into the formation of reservations for Indian tribes.' °
According to a report by the Commissioner for Indian Affairs in
1858, the policy of "concentrating the Indians on small reservations of
land" until they could "support themselves" initiated in California the
same year." The federal goal of restricting tribes to specified areas
ensued primarily through the use of treaties, through which the tribe
would cede most of its land to the 12United States in exchange for a
small reservation exclusively for itself.
Reservation policy led directly into the policies of allotment and assimilation. The General Allotment Act, also known as the Dawes Act,
enforced allotment beginning in 1887.13 The Act took wholesale Indian property out of tribal ownership based on a per capita measurement, then disposed of all surplus lands remaining from the original
reservation after individual Indian allotment through homesteading4
and sale, or through placement in trust of the federal government.
This resulted in "checkerboard" ownership and highly fractionated
interests in land, which still affects Indian lands today. 15 The reasoning
behind the allotment policy varied; some desired allotment in order to
open up more Indian lands for white settlement, and some viewed allotment as a method to "Americanize" the Indian tribes and individuals. "' The following section of this article offers more thorough information about this Act and its consequences.

8.

See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.03[4] [a], at 45
INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 14 (West, 4th ed., 2004).

(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005); William C. Canby, Jr., AMERICAN
9.
10.
11.

COHEN'S, supra note 8, § 1.03[4] [a], at 45.
Id.§ I.03[6] [a], at 65.
Id. (quoting Comm'r Ind. Aff. Ann. Rep., S. ExEc. Doc. No. 35-1, at 357

(1858)).
12. Canby, supra note 8, at 18-19.
13. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (2007)).
14. See COHEN'S, supra note 8, § 3.04[2] [c] [iv], at 195.
15. See Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2517 (1983)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2221 (2007)).
16. COHEN'S, supra note 8, §1.04, at 77.
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In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA"),
or Wheeler-Howard Act.17 The IRA ended the practice of allotment"'
and extended indefinitely the trust period for existing allotments. 9
This Act also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to restore to
tribal ownership any "surplus" lands acquired from the tribes under
allotment, as long as third parties had not acquired rights to that
land. 0
Most importantly, the IRA authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire lands and water rights for the tribes and to create new reservations. Within her or his discretion, the Secretary may acquire "lands,
water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments . . . for the
purpose of providing land for Indians." 2' The intent of this provision
was to encourage economic development for the tribes.22
Interestingly, one portion of the IRA contemplated the effects of
23
the Act on Indian holdings outside of reservations.
This section emphasized the IRA's inapplicability to "Indian holdings of allotments or
homesteads upon the public domain outside of the geographic
boundaries of any Indian reservation." 4 This provision indicates a perceived sanctity of a reservation's borders; the reservation implicates
tribal sovereignty and Indian rights at their strongest.
After Congress implemented the IRA in the 1930's, the federal government again experimented with policies similar to allotment and
assimilation, but this time referred to them as termination and relocation.2 5 Like allotment and assimilation, termination resulted in dramatic and tragic impacts on the Native American population and its
resources.2 6 Termination policies severed the federal trust relationship
over Indian lands for approximately 110 tribes and bands in eight

17. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2007)).
18. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2007) (stating "no land of any Indian reservation, created or
set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, Executive order,
purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.").
19. Id. § 462 ("The existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands and any
restriction on alienation thereof are extended and continued until otherwise directed

by Congress.").
20. Id. § 463(a).
21. Id.§ 465.
22. COHEN'S, supra note 8, §1.05, at 88.
23. 25 U.S.C. § 468 (2007).
24. Id.
25. Canby, supra note 8, at 26-27; see also COHEN'S, supranote 8, § 1.06, at 89.
26. See Michael C. Walch, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1181, 1188-90 (1983).
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states.27 Termination
greatly damaged Indian tribes due to weakened
28
sovereignty.
tribal
Through his address to Congress in 1970, former President Nixon
repudiated the termination policy in calling for a resolution expressly
to end termination.2 President Nixon stressed the importance of the
trust relationship between the federal government and the Indian
tribes and urged more autonomy for tribal self-governance. 3 These
statements inspired a new era of federal policy - the policy of selfdetermination that is presently in effect. In 1975, Congress enacted
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.3 ' This
Act allocated the responsibility for administering federal Indian programs to the Indian tribes themselves and instigated a series
of federal
32
laws supporting further self-determination-based policies.
In concordance with self-determination policy, Congress enacted
the Indian Land Consolidation Act ("ILCA") as an attempt to remedy
the consequences of allotment and termination.3 ILCA intends to
consolidate tribal land holdings and eliminate undivided fractional
interests in allotments. 4 This Act also authorizes tribes to purchase any
or all interest in an allotment subject to the Secretary of the Interior's
approval, with the Secretary taking title to the land acquired under
ILCA into trust. 35 Consistent with the purposes of ILCA, the Secretary
of the Interior promulgated the Land-into-Trust regulations to facilitate reacquisition of tribal lands;36 accordingly, tribes may petition the
Secretary to take both on-reservation and off-reservation acquisitions
into federal trust on behalf of the tribe.37

B. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT ACT OF 1887
The General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as the Dawes Act,
represented a fundamental shift in federal Indian policy. 38 Essentially,
27.
Id. at 1186.
28.
Id. at 1190; see also COHEN'S, supra note 8, §1.06, at 96.
29.
President's Message to Congress, Indian Affairs, 6 WF.EKLY COMp. PREs. Doc.
894, 895 (July 13, 1970).
30.
Id. at 895-96.
31.
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§450-458bbb-2 (2007)).
32.
25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (2007).
33.
See Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, §§ 201-11, 96 Stat. 2517
(1983) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2221 (2007)).
34.
Indian Land Consolidation Act §§ 204(a)-211; see also Canby, supra note 8, at
362-63.
35.
Indian Land Consolidation Act §§ 205, 210.
36.
See 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 (2008) (enacted under the authority of 5 U.S.C. § 301,
which allows for the Secretary of the Interior to issue departmental regulations).
37.
25 C.F.R. §§ 151.9-.11.
38.
Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (2007); see alsoJudith
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allotment sought to divide the tribes from units into individuals by
physically splitting reserved lands into parcels for individuals for agricultural purposes.3 9 The idea behind this policy was that allotment
would assimilate the Indians into general society, eliminating the need
for a special relationship with the federal government and the rights
thereof.4 The Act took wholesale Indian property out of tribal ownership based on a per capita measurement, then disposed of all surplus
lands remaining from the original reservation after individual Indian
allotment through homesteading
and sale or through placement in
41
trust of the federal government.
Allotment resulted in a tremendous decline in the total amount of
Indian-held land, "from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in
1934."04 Tribes lost this land through the "excess" mechanism of the
Act, the forced sale due to the imposition of state property taxation,
and sale to non-Indians.43 Tribes sometimes validly conducted these
sales, yet evidence indicates the exchanges were more often the result
of coercive or fraudulent means.44 Allotment resulted in the "checkerboard" jurisdiction creating highly complex tribal-state-federal jurisdictional disputes, including disputes over the regulation and administration of water rights. 45 Congress ended the allotment policy in 1934
with the Indian Reorganization Act,
yet Congress never formally re46
Act.
Allotment
General
the
pealed
The General Allotment Act articulates a duty of the Secretary of the
Interior to prescribe rules and regulations deemed "necessary to secure
a just and equal distribution thereof among the Indians" where "the
use of water for irrigation is necessary to render the lands within any
Indian reservation available for agricultural purposes."4' This is the
only plain legislative language regarding water rights on allotted lands.
Doctrines governing water rights related to allotment are primarily
judge-made.48 The following section sets the foundation for evaluating

V. Royster, A Primeron Indian Water Rights: More Questions than Answers, 30 TULsA L.J. 61,

86-87 (1994).
39. Royster, supra note 38, at 87.
40. See N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 650 n.1 (1976) (explaining "[t]he objects of this [allotment] policy were to end tribal land ownership and to
substitute private ownership."); see also Canby, supra note 8, at 20-21.
41. See COHEN'S, supra note 8, § 3.04[2] [c] [iv], at 195.
42. Canby, supra note 8, at 22.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Steven J. Shupe, Water in Indian Country: From PaperRights to a Managed Resource,
57 U. COLO. L. REv. 561, 577-78 (1986).
46. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2007)); Royster, supra note 38, at 87.
47. 25 U.S.C. § 381.
48. See generally United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939); United States v.
Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394,
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water rights concurrent with certain categories of land by describing
those types of land affecting Indian interests and rights.
II. TYPES OF LAND AFFECTING INDIAN INTERESTS AND
RIGHTS
Pursuant to the property clause of the United States Constitution,
the federal government may withdraw land from the public domain
and reserve it for a federal purpose.49 Other than reservations, purposes include the creation of wilderness areas, wildlife refuges, national forests and parks, and military bases.50 For this evaluation, most
important in the realm of federally reserved land is the land both Congress and the executive branch have reserved with and for Indian
tribes, through treaties, executive orders, and congressional acts:"
The United States Supreme Court distinguished public lands from
reservations in FederalPower Commission v. Oregon in 1955.52 Public lands
include lands and interests in lands that the United States owns, which
are subject to private appropriation and disposal under public land
laws. 53 Reservations include "national forests, tribal lands embraced
within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and
interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved,
or withheld54 from private appropriation and disposal under public
lands laws."

The complexity of defining "Indian Country" originated from treaties establishing distinct boundaries between tribal territory and areas
open to non-Indian settlement.55 Aboriginal title, meaning tribal ownership rights predating treaty agreement-established rights, provides
another basis for asserting tribal ownership of land.56 Territorial integrity provided the foundation from which the sovereign Indian tribes
1417 (9th Cir. 1983); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52-53 (9th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 912 (D. Idaho 1928); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys. (Big Horn IV), 899 P.2d
848, 854 (Wyo. 1995).
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 435
(1955). See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); United States v. Dist.
Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 522-23 (1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 601 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 564 (1908); see, e.g., Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976); United States v.
Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 528 (1939).
50.

DAVID H. GETcHEs, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 311 (3d ed. 1997); see also Colo.

River, 424 U.S. at 805.
51.
See generally COHEN'S, supra note 8, § 3.04 (providing a brief history of federally
reserved land for Indian tribes).
52. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 443-44 (1954).
53. Id.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 444 n.10.
See COHEN'S, supra note 8, § 3.04(2) (a), at 183-84.
Canby, supra note 8, at 344-48.
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and the United States interacted. Congress codified a definition of
Indian Country in 1948, based on Supreme Court jurisprudence. 7
This definition includes reservations, "dependent Indian communities," and allotments.

58

In 1993, the Court noted, "the intent of Con-

gress... was to designate as Indian country all lands set aside by whatever means for the residence of tribal Indians under federal protection, together with trust and restricted Indian allotments.
The Land-into-Trust regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
the Interior define reservation land, trust land, restricted land, and
tribal consolidation area.60 Reservation land established by treaty, executive order, or Congressional act includes "that area of land over
which the tribe is recognized by the United States as having governmental jurisdiction.""' Additionally, because of allotment, land owned
by non-Indians in fee and out of trust on reservation land also exists.
Trust land is "land the title to which is held in trust by the United
States for an individual Indian or a tribe. 6 2 The National Congress of
American Indians ("NCAI") summarizes the trust relationship as in63
cluding land most often within the boundaries of a reservation. According to NCAI, "[t] rust status means that the land falls under tribal
government authority and is generally not subject to state laws. Trust
status also creates limitations on the use of the land and requires federal approval for most actions."6 4 Trust land may further be considered
restricted because of limitations either within the conveyance instrument, or because of a federal law imposing restrictions.65
Under the modern federal policy of reacquiring land for tribes,
tribal consolidation areas constitute another category of lands affecting
Indian interests. A tribal consolidation area is "a specific area of land
with respect to which the tribe has prepared, and the Secretary has
approved, a plan for the acquisition of land in trust status for the
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2007); COHEN'S, supra note 8, § 3.04(2) (c), at 188.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. (stating: "Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154
and1156 of this title, the term 'Indian country', as used in this chapter, means (a) all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rightsof-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within
the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same.").
59. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993) (citing F.
Cohen, HANDBOOK Or FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 34 (1982 ed.)).
60. 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(d)-(f), (h) (2008).
61.
Id. § 151.2(0.
62. Id. § 151.2(d).
63. National Congress of American Indians, Land-Into-Trust,
http://www.ncai.org/Land-Into-Trust.57.0.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).

64.

Id.

65.

25 C.F.R. § 151.2(e).
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tribe."r Land may be reacquired from former allotments owned by
non-Indians, or from surplus lands either homesteaded or opened for
homesteading, yet never claimed under the allotment policy." NCAI
describes policy implications of reacquiring land, noting, "[t]he purpose of the Secretary of Interior's land-into-trust authority is to restore
Indian land bases, to rehabilitate Indian economic life and to foster
recovery from centuries of oppression."68
An act of Congress may unilaterally abrogate the status of Indian
Country. 9 Congress has removed, allotted, assimilated, reorganized,
terminated, relocated, and reinstated American Indian peoples since
colonial times1 °

The current federal policy promotes Indian self-

determination." However, the allotment and assimilation policies of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continue to impact
the prosperity and general condition of Indian tribes in the United
States today. As a result of modernized policies combined with more
access to resources, tribes increasingly dictate their own steps for recovery from the damaging federal policies of the past, including
through the reacquisition of reservation land. The following section
provides a basis for evaluating water rights of reacquired lands by examining the tenets of the reserved rights doctrine.
III. BASIC RULES ABOUT WATER FOR INDIAN LANDS: THE
RESERVED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Many constitutive sources for the types of land affecting Indian interests and rights do not expressly include a reservation of water. Under the commerce clause, the federal government retains the right to
regulate navigable waters of the United States.72 The judiciary created
the reserved rights doctrine to ensure federally reserved lands set aside
for a particular purpose would have adequate water to fulfill
that pur74
3
rights.
reserved
these
governs
law
state,
not
Federal,
pose.
In 1905, the Supreme Court first articulated the reserved rights
doctrine in United States v. Winans.7 5 In that case, the United States
66. Id. § 151.2(h).
67. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.
68. National Congress of American Indians, supranote 63.
69. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 588 (1977); see also COHEN, supra
note 8, § 3.04(3), at 196.
70. See Canby, supra note 8, at 10-28 (providing a historical overview of federal Indian law and policy).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 25-33.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824).
73. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1905).
74. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667, 670 (1974); see
alsoJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584-86 (1823).
75. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. See also Winters, 207 US. at 576-77
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brought suit against a private individual, on behalf of the Yakima Indian Tribe, to remove an obstruction that individual created to the
fishing rights reserved by the Tribe. 6 A treaty between the Yakima
Tribe and United States established the Tribe's right to fish." The
Court stated the treaty was a grant of rights from the Tribe, not to the
Tribe, therefore the Tribe reserved the rights it did not grant.7 The
non-Indian individual in this case had no rights to obstruct the Tribe's
ability to fish because the Tribe reserved, rather than granted, the right
to fish.79
Winters v. United States took the Winans analysis further by establish-

ing implied reserved water rights for Indian reservations. 8 0 Like Winans, the Winters case also involved a dispute over water use between a
tribe and private individual; however, unlike the treaty in Winans, the
treaty in Winters did not explicitly mention water use."' The Winters
Court held that even though the treaty did not explicitly reserve water
rights, treaty interpretation consistent with the canons of construction
would tip in favor of the tribes retaining implied water rights to fulfill
the purposes of the reservation. The Court based its decision on the
fact that the reservation in this case was established from a larger tract
of land in order to fulfill the government policy of transforming the
Indian tribal culture from a "nomadic" to an "agrarian" lifestyle, and
such transformation could only occur if the tribal lands were severely
reduced in size, making them more amenable to agricultural pursuits.83
Since the lands were judged arid, they would remain "practically valueless" without an adequate supply of water for irrigation.8 ' The Winters
Court thus concluded that the "United States... intended the reservation of land and other
resources to be sufficient for the Indians to
85
make a successful life."

Later, the Supreme Court applied the reserved rights doctrine established by Winans and Winters to federally reserved land in Federal

76.
77.
78.

Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 381.

79. Id. at 384. See also DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN
GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAw 129-30 (2001).
80.
Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
81.
Compare Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77 (holding that Tribe's reservation of land
implicitly reserved with it the associated waters to ensure that such land was not a "barren waste"), with Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 (finding that the terms of the reserving treaty
specifically provided an access to fish the waters in question).
82.
Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
83.
Id. at 576.
84. WILKINS & LOMAWAiMA, supra note 79, at 130.
85. JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTs: THE WINTERS DOcTRINE IN ITs
SOctAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT, 1880s-1930s 124 (Univ. of Okla. Press 2000).
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Power Commission v. Oregon in 1955 and Arizona v. California in 1963.86
In FederalPower Commission, the Court determined that a reservation of
federal land for a particular purpose removed water sources on that
land from appropriation by other non-federal users.87 Then, in Arizona
v. California,the Court announced that the Winters reserved rights doctrine applies to federal lands."8
Four elements assist in the evaluation of reserved water rights: intent, purpose, scope, and quantification.89 First, intent reflects the intent of Congress in establishing the reservation. Second, the purpose
of the reservation may include primary and secondary purposes depending on the jurisdiction.9 ' Third, scope refers to whether the reserved rights apply to surface or ground water, 9 as well as applicability
to in-stream flows. Fourth, quantification also varies based on jurisdiction and may be determined by the practically irrigable acreage standard,93 homeland standard,94 or historically irrigated standard.95
The Winters decision introduced "the basic themes of tribal water
rights," in that the "creation of an Indian reservation impliedly reserves
water rights" to the reservation's tribe.6 Those Winters rights carry a
priority date that attaches to the establishment of the reservation and
to the purpose thereof.97 Since Winters, the Court has "repeatedly recognized that the Government, when it created each Indian reservation,
86. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 443-44 (1954); Arizona v. Califomia, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1962).
87. Fed. Power Comm'n, 349 U.S. at 444.
88. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 597-98; see also Western States Water Laws, Federal Reserved Water Rights,
http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/fedreservedwater.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2009).
89. Professors Jerilyn DeCoteau and Sarah Klahn, Indian Water Law, University of
Denver Sturm College of Law (Sept. 6, 2007).
90. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 599-600.
91.
See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that
multiple purposes determine reserved water rights, including hunting, fishing and
agriculture); In re Gen. Adjudication of the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 96 (Wyo.
1988) [hereinafter BigHorn 1](holding that reserved water rights attach to agricultural
purposes only.).
92. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976) (holding that the
United States can protect its waters from the subsequent diversion of either surface or
groundwater); New Mexico v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985) (holding
that Pueblo water rights include not only surface water but also groundwater "interrelated to the surface water as an integral part of the hydrologic cycle"); Big Horn I, 753
P.2d at 100 (holding that the reserved water doctrine does not extend to groundwater).
93. See Arizona v. California,373 U.S. at 601.
94. See In re General Adjudication of the Gila River Sys. and Source, 35 P.3d 68, 80
(Ariz. 2001) [hereinafter Gila I1].
95. See Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. at 1009.
96. Royster, supra note 38, at 66.
97. Id.
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'intended to deal fairly with the Indians by reserving for them the waters without which their lands would have been useless."' 98 However,
along with the shifting federal policy regarding Indian tribes and their
resources, the dynamic status of reservation land and the accompanying reserved water rights continues to keep water users guessing.99 The
following section describes water rights specifically for land divided
during allotment.
IV. THE BEGINNING OF WATER RIGHTS FOR ALLOTTED LAND
The United States Supreme Court first addressed water rights of
Indian allottees in 1939, in United States v. Powers"'0 The issue in Powers
centered on non-Indian successors to Indian allottees' water use in
relation to a downstream federal irrigation project. The Court found
that the water rights reserved with the reservation's establishment continued to exist through the allotment, and the water originally belonging to the tribe still belonged to the tribe.' ' The individual allottee
enjoyed a usufructury right from the tribe to use a 'just and equal distribution" of water as stated in the General Allotment Act.'0 2 The Court
behind aldetermined this holding consistent with the federal policy
03
lotment - the policy to make the Indians into farmers.
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit further analyzed Indian allottees, nonIndian successors, and the water rights afforded to each.' 4 Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton interpreted the General Allotment Act as conveying a transferable water right to the Indian allottee, so that upon
transfer of the allotment, an Indian allottee may sell the usufructury
right to the reserved water."l°

Because allottees' water rights derive

from tribal rights, the Ninth Circuit found that the priority date for
allottees is the date the reservation was created, and Indian allottees'
rights are not lost through non-use.106
Non-Indians can acquire reservation land either by purchasing allotment parcels from allottees who received fee patents to their land,
98.
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 573-74 (1983) (citing Aizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963)).
99.
See Carcieri, 128 S. Ct. 1058 (demonstrating a substantial re-interpretation of
federal Indian policy impacting the ability of the Secretary of the Interior to take Indian lands into trust).
100.
Powers, 305 U.S. at 527; see also United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho
1928).
101.
Powers, 305 U.S. at 532.
102.
Id. at 533; Royster, supra note 38, at 88-89.
103.
Royster, supra note 38, at 88 ("Because the allottees' rights are tied to the agrarian purposes of the allotment policy, allottees have no rights to trial water reserved for
other than irrigation purposes.").
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 43 (9th Cir. 1981).
104.
105.
Id. at 50.
106.
Id. at 51; see also Adair,478 F. Supp. at 348-49; Hibner,27 F.2d at 912.
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or by homesteading the "surplus" land of the originally allotted reservation. 7' The Walton Court defined three governing principles regarding an allottee's right to use reserved waters and the effects of that
right on a non-Indian purchaser. 8 First, the General Allotment Act
provision for an "equal and just distribution" of water requires that the

number of irrigable acres limit the extent of the right owned. Second,
the Indian allottee's right contains a date-of-reservation priority date,
which also applies to the non-Indian purchaser's subsequently acquired right. Third, although the Indian allottee does not lose the
right for non-use, a non-Indian successor is subject to the use it or lose
it rule.' 9 In sum, Walton dictates:
The non-Indian successor acquires a right to water being appropriated by the Indian allottee at the time title passes. The non-Indian
also acquires a right, with a date-of-reservation priority date, to water
that he or she appropriates with reasonable diligence after the passage of title. If the full measure of the Indian's reserved water right is
not acquired by this means and maintained by continued use, it is lost
to the non-Indian successor." °
The Walton Court recognized that allowing the water right to transfer with the land commands an economic benefit for the Indian allottee, ensuring adherence to the Congressional policy of benefiting Indian allottees and fulfilling trust and treaty obligations."' Rights acquired in this manner by a non-Indian are Walton rights."2
Non-Indians who acquire land through homesteading do not retain any Winters rights that previously attached to the reservation.'3
Severing surplus lands from the allotted reservation and opening such
lands to homesteading terminates the reserved water rights because
they are no longer necessary to fulfill the reservation's purposes." 4 No
court has addressed water rights for
surplus lands opened for sale but
5
not severed from the reservation.

Trust or other restricted status indicates continuing federal policy
of either fulfilling the purpose of the original reservation or ensuring

107. COHEN'S, supra note 8, at § 19.03[8] [b].
108.
Walton , 647 F.2d at 51.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111.
Id. at 47; see also Getches, supranote 50, at 329.
112. COHEN'S, supra note 8, at § 19.03[8] [b].
113. See United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1984); Adair, 723
F.2d at 1417; Walton I, 647 F.2d at 51; Hibner, 27 F.2d at 912; Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 11314.
114. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363; Big Horn IV, 899 P.2d at 854; see also COHEN'S, supra
note 8, at § 19.03[8] [b].
115. COHEN'S, supra note 8, at § 19.03[8] [b]; see also Royster, supranote 38, at 90.
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the marketable benefit of the land to the tribes." 6 What happens to
the reserved rights when land, having left Indian ownership, returns to
Indian ownership? The following section addresses the present state of
the law governing whether land reacquired by Indian tribes enjoys reserved water rights, as well as how to calculate the priority date of such
lands.
V. CASE LAW GOVERNING REACQUIRED LAND AND RESERVED
RIGHTS
Tribes reacquire at least three types of lands, including lands
owned by individual Indians in trust or in fee, former allotments
owned by non-Indians, and surplus lands."7 Individual Indians owning
current or former allotments retain their full Winters rights; therefore,
the rights revert back to the tribe in full when reacquired. ' 8 The rights
accorded to the other two varieties of reacquired lands are not as
straightforward.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether
tribes retain reserved water rights for reacquired allotted land that
non-Indians owned in fee or for reacquired surplus land. Only two
courts addressed these complicated scenarios, and they reached contradictory results. The Wyoming Supreme Court evaluated the status
of these rights in the case In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System, a case not yet fully resolved." 9 The
Ninth Circuit analyzed
these rights as well, in the 1984 case United
20
States v. Anderson.

Both the Ninth Circuit and the Wyoming Supreme Court agree
that the water rights the tribe obtained when it reacquired former allotments owned in fee by non-Indians carry a date-of-reservation priority date. 2 ' However, the two courts split when calculating the quantity
of reacquired water. The Ninth Circuit held that tribes reacquire only
the portion of reserved rights that the non-Indian users did not lose
through non-use.' 22 To the contrary, the Wyoming Supreme Court
indicated that tribes regain
the full reserved rights originally appurte23
nant to the allotted lands.'

The Ninth Circuit and the Wyoming Supreme Court split on both
the priority date and on the quantity of reserved rights concerning
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
114.
122.
123.

See Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1361; see Discussion infra Part III.
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1361; COHEN'S, supra note 8, at § 19.03[8] [c].
Powers, 305 U.S. at 532; see also Royster, supra note 38, at 91.
Big Horn TV, 899 P.2d at 848; Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 76.
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1358.
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362; Big Horn IV 899 P.2d at 855; Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362.
Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 114.
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reacquired surplus lands. The Wyoming Supreme Court utilized a
broad application of the date-of-reservation priority date, finding that
date applies to all reacquired lands.2 4 The Ninth Circuit reached a
different outcome, concluding that surplus lands do not carry reserved
water rights upon severance from the original reservation. 25 The
Ninth Circuit held that these lands constitute a new reservation, with
the priority date being the date of reacquisition.12 The Wyoming Supreme Court's holding in Big Horn is much more favorable to the
Tribes reacquiring land in concord with the federal self-determination
policy, because the court did not make Native Americans' reserved
rights dependent on a non-Indian's due diligence and use. The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, made reacquired rights from surplus lands
virtually worthless to a tribe without the reserved right status.
A. UNi-D STATES. V. ANDERSON
The Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Anderson in 1984. This
case evaluated the on- and off-reservation effects of the water adjudication in Chamokane Basin. 27 The court held that Winters rights appurtenant to allotted lands purchased by a non-Indian pass with title when
the tribe reacquires the lands, and those rights retain their original
priority date. 128 However, where the homesteader lost his or her perfected water rights, or never had them originally, no rights exist for the
tribe to regain upon reacquisition. 1 9
The Ninth Circuit relied on the sensitivity doctrine to junior users
in its evaluation, intending to protect rights acquired in good faith by
third parties. To accommodate those third parties, the court determined that rights gained upon reacquisition from surplus lands constitute a "newly created federal reservation." 30 However, the court's determination is inconsistent with federal self-determination policy;
therefore,
the decision also potentially violates the plenary power doc3
1
trine.'
In Anderson, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the doctrine of reserved rights attaches those rights to the status of the land, not to the
unique status of the tribes as they exist in relation to the federal government. However, as previously described in Part IV of this article,
the reserved rights doctrine emerged from sovereignty-based interactions between the United States and the tribes, in that a sovereign-to124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Big Horn IV, 888 P.2d at 855.
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363.
Id.
Id. at 1361.
Id.
Id. at 1363.
Id.

131.

See discussion infra Part II.
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sovereign relationship created the reservations. Reserved rights, although specific to reservations, do not exist by virtue of the physical
land, but rather because of Congress's intent in setting aside the land
and Congress's specific purposes for that land. That intent and purpose resumes when the tribe reacquires part of the original reservation, and the current federal policy of self-determination and legislated
priorities of land reacquisition for tribes especially reaffirms this in an
attempt to remedy the destructive consequences of allotment.
B. IN RE THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF ALL RIGHTS TO USE WATER IN
THE BIG HORN RIVER SYSTEM AND ALL OTHER SOURCES

The Wyoming Supreme Court addressed water rights for reacquired lands in both Big Horn I and Big Horn IV In Big Horn I, the
court applied the same reasoning for why a non-Indian successor
should succeed to the treaty priority date enjoyed by the Indian allottee, and to whether an Indian or tribal re-purchaser should reacquire
that same priority.1 3 2 Instead of applying the reserved rights doctrine

only to the reserved land itself, the court recognized a more accurate
and broad construction of the doctrine applying to the intent and
purpose for that reserved land. Big Horn I did not distinguish between
reservation lands Indians continuously held and reservation land Indians reacquired, recognizing that all reacquired lands as part of the
original reservation
were reservation land entitled to the same reserved
133
water rights.

Big Horn IV relied on the court's analysis in Big Horn I.134 The court
recognized the reserved rights appurtenant to the land as in fact appurtenant to the unique status of the tribe as well. 3 ' The court concluded, "the priority date for the reserved water rights was extended to
the diminished portion of the reservation; restored, retroceded, undisposed of, and reacquired lands owned by the tribes; fee lands held by
Indian allottees; and lands held by Indian and non-Indian successors to
allottees." 3 6 This holding concurs with federal policy, distinguishing it
from the Ninth Circuit in Anderson, because of its recognition of the
reserved rights doctrine as inseparable from tribal possession of original reservation land. Maintaining the full benefit of reservation land
for the tribes fulfills the intent of the reserved rights doctrine.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 114.
Id.
Big Horn IX 888 P.2d at 853.
Id. at 855.
Id.
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VI. WATER RIGHTS AFTER ANDERSON AND BIG HORN
This section summarizes the current status of water rights, as well as
the types of land affecting Indian interests and rights based on the
analysis contained in the previous sections. If reservation land stays in
trust or Indian ownership, it maintains the benefits of the reserved
rights doctrine, including a date-of-reservation priority date. Furthermore, use it or lose it, abandonment, and forfeiture of water rights do
not apply. Similarly, allotted land continuously in trust or Indian ownership maintains its Winters rights, applying to allottees as necessary for
full market benefit or to fulfill the reservation's purpose.137
In the instance of a non-Indian purchase of allotted land, the nonIndian acquires Walton rights to assure the Indian allottee the full economic benefit of the allotment.'3 The use it or lose it doctrine applies
because the purpose of the reservation no longer exists when nonIndians own the land. 139 The purpose is appurtenant to the unique
relationship between the tribe and
the United States, not between a
4
States.1
United
the
and
non-Indian
Surplus allotment land opened for homesteading includes two
categories: (1) land ceded to the government, severed from the reservation, and returned to the public domain; and (2) land not severed
but remaining part of the reservation and opened for sale to nonIndians. According to the Ninth Circuit, non-Indian settlement of any
surplus land open for homesteading lacks any reserved water141rights
because the purpose relevant to Indian ownership has been lost.
The three primary types of land a tribe potentially reacquires include varied reserved water rights. When a tribe reacquires land previously owned by an Indian in trust or in fee, the individual Indian retained full Winters rights that subsequently transfer to the tribe. 42 Former allotment land reacquired from a non-Indian successor retains its
date-of-reservation priority date according to both the Ninth Circuit
and the Wyoming Supreme Court, but, as previously
described, the
43
quantity differs between the two jurisdictions.1
Potentially reacquired surplus land includes four sub-categories:
(1) opened, severed, and claimed; (2) opened, severed, and not
claimed; (3) opened, not severed, and claimed; and (4) opened, not
severed, and not claimed. In Big Horn, the Wyoming Supreme Court
concluded that all original reservation land that the tribe reacquired
carries a date-of-reservation priority date regardless of its surplus
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See discussion infra Part V.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365.
Powers, 305 U.S. at 532.
See Discussion infra Part VI.
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status.' 44 The Ninth Circuit, in the Anderson case, held specifically with
regard to surplus land opened, severed from the reservation, and not
claimed. The Anderson Court concluded that land severed from the
reservation returned to the public domain and therefore did not retain
reserved water rights. The court reasoned that Winters rights are intended to assist in accomplishing the needs of the reservation, so if the
land is removed from tribal possession the purposes for which the Winters rights are implied are thereby eliminated.' 45 Courts have not yet
ruled on water rights for surplus lands that are opened, not severed,
and either claimed or unclaimed.
The following section evaluates the current federal policy of selfdetermination and the federal goals of increasing the tribal land base.
Analogies to cases regarding acquisition of land under the Indian Reorganization Act and the tax status of tribal reacquired land provides a
benchmark from which to determine whether reacquired land taken
into trust should retain full reserved water right benefits under any
circumstance.
VII. CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY OF INDIAN SELFDETERMINATION AND REACQUIRED LANDS
As described in Part II(A) of this analysis, Congress attempted to
reverse the destructive consequences of allotment through the Indian
Reorganization Act in 1934 and the Indian Land Consolidation Act,
recently amended in 2007. Both Acts recognize a federal policy of increasing tribal land holdings through purchase of lands part of the
original reservation and lost through allotment, and also through purchase of off-reservation land, as identified in the Land-into-Trust regulations.1 " Acquisition of land under the IRA has been challenged and
judicially upheld. The following sections summarize and analogize
IRA cases and tax status of reacquired land cases to water rights for
reacquired lands.
A. IRA AcQUISITION
Two federal district court cases explicitly uphold the federal government's authority to take land into trust that the tribe reacquired on
the open market. 47 In Nevada v. United States, Nevada challenged the
validity of the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Set-

144.
145.
146.

See Discussion infra Part VI (B).
See Discussion infra Part VI(A).
See Discussion infra Part 11(A).

147. See Carcieri, 128 S. Ct. 1058. The Supreme Court's holding in Carcierirecently
limited the ability of the Secretary of the Interior to do so only for tribes federally recognized in 1934.
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tement Act of 1990.48 The Nevada court held that the acquisition pro-

vision under the Indian Reorganization Act did not represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.' 49 Furthermore, the
court held that Congress could acquire land for an Indian reservation
and impose federal regulations on that land without the consent of the
state. ,5
In South Dakota v. Department of the Interior, the district court recognized the IRA intent "'to safeguard Indian lands against alienation
from Indian ownership and against physical deterioration."' 5 ' The district court upheld the Department of the Interior's rational basis for its
decision to take land into trust because the IRA granted legitimate authority to acquire land to be held in trust for Indian tribes. 52 These
cases reinforce the federal policy of tribal land acquisition and further
reinforce the validity of applying federal regulations and standards to
land taken into trust.
B. TAX AND REACQUIRED LANDS
The United States Supreme Court evaluated tax jurisdiction over
reacquired land in 1998 and 2005. In Cass County, Minnesota v. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, the Court held that state and local governments may tax reservation land made alienable by Congress, sold to
non-Indians, and later repurchased by the tribe because Congress
manifested an "unmistakably clear" intent to allow such taxation.' 53 In
Cass County, the Leech Lake Band sought to re-establish its land base by
"purchasing back parcels of reservation land that were allotted to indi54
vidual Indians or sold to non-Indians during the allotment period."
The Court concluded that Congress clearly intended to authorize state
taxation because it made lands freely alienable under allotment, thus
withdrawing federal protection. 5 5 Without the Leech Lake Band engaging the land-into-trust procedure set forth in § 465 of the IRA, the
federal protection
of state tax exemption would not apply to reac56
quired lands.'

148. Nevada v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Nev. 2002).
149. Id. at 1250.
150. Id. at 1251.
151. South Dakota v. United States Dep't of Interior [hereinafter South Dakota v.
DOI], 314 F. Supp. 2d 935, 943 (D. S.D. 2004) (citing H.R. 7902, 73rd Cong., tit. III, § 1
(1934)).
152. South Dakota v. DOI,314 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
153. Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 106
(1998).
154. Id. at 108.
155. Id. at 111.
156. Id. at 114.
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The United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
City of Sherrill,New York v. Oneida Indian Nation.'57 Sherrillconcerned tax
authority over land that the Tribe last possessed in 1805.158 Due to federal treaties ceding land, federal removal policies, and state purchase
of land, the Oneida Nation's land ownership decreased from over six
million acres to 17,000 acres in what is now central New York. 150 In City
of Sherrill, the Oneidas argued that their "acquisition of fee title to...
parcels of historic reservation land revived the Oneidas' ancient sovereignty piecemeal over each parcel;" therefore, regulatory authority
over those parcels belonged to the Tribe and not to the City of
Sherrill. 160 Because the parcels existed within the boundaries of the
reservation that the Oneidas originally occupied, the tribe maintained
that the properties were exempt from taxation and thus refused to pay
the city's assessed property taxes. 16 The Court held the tribes may not
assert sovereignty unilaterally without the explicit consent of Congress;
in addition, equitable considerations barred such a unilateral assertion
of sovereignty.' 62 The Court referenced its earlier holding in Cass
County, noting that without engaging the trust protection in IRA section 465, the Tribe may not enjoy tax benefits without going through
the land-to-trust mechanism. 63 Cass County and Sherrill emphasize the
importance of the trust relationship between the Native American
tribes and the federal government.
C. HOW THE TAx AND IRA CASES MAY AFFECT WATER RIGHTS FOR REACQUIRED LANDS

Both the IRA and tax jurisdiction cases reinforce the importance of
the trust relationship to tribal sovereign rights and interests trumping
non-Indian assertions of rights. These cases indicate the judiciary's
predisposition to find a trust relationship in order to uphold the
unique rights of Native American tribes. On the basis of these cases, as
combined with the stated policies in the IRA and ILCA, reacquired
land taken into trust lawfully should receive the full benefit of reserved
water rights. Congressional intent clearly authorizes the trust relationship, and the judiciary must defer to that "plenary power."

157. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
158. Id. at 198.
159. Id. at 203, 211.
160. Id. at 202.
161. Id. at 211.
162. Id. at 220-21 (explaining that such equitable considerations include "the purposes for which the land will be used; the impact on the State and its political subdivisions resulting from the removal of the land from the tax rolls; and jurisdictional problems and potential conflicts of land use which may arise.").
163. Id. at 220.

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 12

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Although the law remains unsettled as to whether Native American
tribes retain full reserved water rights when a tribe reacquires land
from non-Indian ownership outside of the Big Horn adjudications,
Congress and the courts should ensure that any land belonging to an
original tribal reservation retains reserved rights if an Indian tribe reacquires the land. The policy behind the doctrine remains intact:
namely, the benefit of water for the tribe. Such assurance further supports the policy foundations of reserved rights if the reacquired lands
are subsequently taken into trust, as demonstrated analogously by the
IRA and tax jurisdiction cases. Congressional intent, evidenced by the
unique federal status and protections afforded to Indian tribes, could
hardly be clearer than the trust relationship.
Congress should not abandon the tribes in their reacquisition efforts and should dictate, in conjunction with tribal lawmakers, that
former allotment land reacquired and taken into trust retains its original reserved water rights. By virtue of the Supreme Court's precedent,
the United States judiciary is bound to uphold Congressional plenary
power. The reserved rights doctrine should attach to reacquired lands
because the underlying premise of the doctrine itself lies within fulfilling the purpose of the reservation. By virtue of the Winters doctrine,
the very existence of a reservation exemplifies Congress's intent to reserve water rights in order to make the reservation functionally practicable. This intent is inextricably linked to federal policy purposed to
benefit Indian tribes and to satisfy treaty obligations through the reservation of land. Limiting the reserved water rights of reacquired reservation land contradicts this well-settled policy. Trust status further confirms Congress's intent to maintain the reacquired land as fullybenefited reservation land. Therefore, the reserved rights doctrine
should apply to reacquired land held in trust, allowing the proverbial
glass of reserved water rights to return full, in a complete circle to its
original and rightful owners.
APPENDIX I: CONTINUUM OF LEGAL IKELIHOOD TO REGAIN
RESERVED RIGHTS
LAND MOST LIKELY TO RETAIN ALL ORIGINAL RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS UPON REACQUISITION BY THE TRIBE
"
*
*

Reservation land continuously held in trust
0 Including allotted land
Reservation land continuously held in Indian ownership
0 Including allotted land
Allotment land approved for trust status from a nonIndian purchaser who put all Walton rights to beneficial
use
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*
*
*
*
"
"
"
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Allotment land from a non-Indian purchaser who put
all Walton rights to beneficial use
Allotment land approved for trust status from a nonIndian purchaser with no regard to use it or lose it
Allotment land from a non-Indian purchaser with no
regard to use it or lose it
Surplus land ceded, not severed, and unclaimed
Surplus land ceded, not severed, and settled by nonIndians
Surplus land ceded, severed, and unclaimed
Surplus land ceded, severed, and settled by non-Indians

LAND LEAST LIKELY TO RETAIN ALL ORIGINAL RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS UPON REACQUISITION BYTHE TRIBE
*

Factors evaluated include trust status of land, whether
land was allotted or surplus, and if it was surplus
whether the land was severed or claimed, and whether
the rights were put to beneficial use by a non-Indian
owner.

